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In a world with over 70 million people registered as forcibly displaced, gover-
ning migration has long been high on the European Union’s agenda. However, 
rather than emerging from evidence-based perspectives, policy responses 
have often been built on simplistic premises regarding how refugees’ mobility 
and decision-making work. Findings from the research project SYRMAGINE 
can contribute to the revising of these views:
 • While many Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey strongly long for a return to 
their native country should the conflict end, returning under current conditions 
is perceived as unsafe – with individuals fearing military conscription or politi-
cal persecution upon return, especially those opposed to al-Assad’s  regime.
 • Often moderate aspirations to stay in the host country exist, even should the 
war end. Among refugees in Turkey, strong resistance to the idea of migrating 
to Europe is also prevalent. The consideration to settle down is based on a pref-
erence to remain geographically close to Syria, to live in a culturally familiar 
context, feelings of relative safety compared to Syria, family ties, and the notion 
that building a life worth living might be possible where one currently lives.  
 • Factors which influence refugees’ decisions to move on to another third country 
are a combination of insufficient legal safety, financial vulnerability, and inad-
equate access to health and education services within the host country; views 
within families about onwards migration; and, refugees’ current life satisfac-
tion and future imaginations.
Policy Implications
With ongoing violence in Syria alongside the legal and economic vulnerabilities 
faced by refugees in the Middle East, safe pathways to reaching third countries 
need to be expanded. In the Middle East itself, policies should focus on improving 
legal and educational conditions for refugees and supporting anti-discrimina-
tion measures. Return campaigns and refoulement have to stop immediately.
Mustafa Hatip
Humanitarian activist
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Migration Decision-Making of Refugees: A Missing Perspective 
in Policymaking 
According to the United Nations High commissioner for Refugees (UNHcR), there 
are 70.8 million forcibly displaced people worldwide today – of which 25.4 million 
are refugees. Syrians make up the biggest proportion: since 2011, 6.1 million have 
been internally displaced (IDMC 2018), 5.5 million have fled to one of Syria’s neigh-
bouring countries, and around one million to Europe (UNHcR 2019). The topic of 
forced displacement is thus high on the European Union’s agenda. As a result, a 
variety of new policies have been put in place to govern mobile populations mov-
ing towards and residing in- and outside of Europe – such as the EU–Turkey deal 
in 2016, as well as the repeated attempts to establish “migrant reception centres” 
beyond the continent’s borders.
European policy responses usually build on certain premises regarding how 
refugees’ mobility and decision-making work. One routine assumption is that mi-
grants are pulled to Northern or Western Europe because of better labour oppor-
tunities and more secure asylum conditions (Frowd 2019). European countries’ 
information campaigns, on the other hand, imply that welfare policies in destina-
tion countries and flawed risk assessments drive migration towards them, and thus 
posit that demystifying rumours would lead to lower levels of irregular migration. 
Some European governments have also argued that search-and-rescue missions in 
the Mediterranean Sea are a pull factor for migration. Local regimes in the Middle 
East meanwhile have strategically used migrants to exert diplomatic pressure on 
neighbours. In October 2019, for example, President Erdoğan warned that he would 
“open the gates” and send 3.6 million refugees to Europe if EU nations did not back 
him in his military ambitions in Northern Syria. 
despite the extensive political attention paid in Europe to “the migration  crisis” 
in 2015, much less is known about the living conditions of refugees in Asia, Africa, or 
in Arab countries – and more specifically alternative migration trajectories  within 
these contexts. To address this lacuna, the research project SYRMAGINE (Lea 
Müller-Funk: SYRMAGINE: Syrian Imaginations of Europe [2017–2019]) focused 
on Syrian refugees’ living conditions and migration decision-making  processes in 
Lebanon and Turkey: How do Syrians see life in these two countries? What do they 
think about staying, returning to Syria, or moving on to another third country? 
To answer these questions, a standardised survey with 757 respondents as well as 
41 in-depth interviews were conducted with Syrians living in four cities – Beirut, 
Tripoli, Istanbul, and Izmir – between March and July 2018 (Müller-Funk et al. 
2019). 
Increasingly Restrictive Policies towards Syrian Refugees ...
Syrian refugees face difficult legal conditions in both Lebanon and Turkey, but to di-
vergent degrees. The Geneva convention is not applied to Syrians in either  country. 
In Lebanon, the government does not grant legal effect to UNHCR’s recognition 
of refugee status. Registered Syrians are thus theoretically considered to be wait-
ing for resettlement to another country. Since 2015, new restrictions have made it 
increasingly difficult for Syrians to enter the country and renew residence permits. 
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The work space of Syrians is concentrated in specific sectors such as construction, 
agriculture, cleaning, and garbage collection, or they work as waiters or hotel staff. 
In 2015, UNHcR registrations were suspended and the right to employment was 
barred for those already registered. 
This legal framework has resulted in a situation where a vast number of Syrians 
lack valid residence permits and work under irregular conditions. Lebanon’s eco-
nomic situation has worsened in recent years, further exacerbating refugees’ living 
conditions. Without a valid permit, Syrian refugees are considered to be in breach 
of the law and may be detained or forcibly returned to their native country. Authori-
ties have repeatedly issued deportation orders informing refugees that they must 
leave (Janmyr 2018). The Lebanese government also pursues a no-camp policy: 
according to Lebanese political discourse, Syrian refugees should not stay in the 
country as Palestinians once did. Lebanese groups have repeatedly called for and 
indeed attempted to burn down the tents of Syrian refugees. 
Syrians in Turkey have since 2014 been granted temporary protection (TP) 
under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection. The provisions of the 
TP regime include the right to legal stay, the principle of non-refoulement and a 
deportation ban, the right to health and education services, as well as principles 
governing the operation of and support in the camps (Toğral Koca 2016). How-
ever, the regulation falls short of providing an explicit right to work. TP holders can 
 apply for a work permit, but there is no guarantee that government authorities will 
grant it (Ineli-ciger 2014). Furthermore, due to a presidential decree it is possible 
to circumvent the principle of non-refoulement: namely, if there is a threat to public 
health, morality, or order. This has been used, for example, to deport Kurdish Syr-
ians who support the People’s Protection Units (YPG) as well as Islamic State sym-
pathisers back to Syria. In 2017 meanwhile, several municipalities such as Istanbul 
as well as cities on the Turkish–Syrian border stopped TP registration. 
Pathways for these individuals to leave Lebanon and Turkey legally have re-
mained restricted since the beginning of the Syrian conflict. Applications for work 
and study visas abroad have low chances of being accepted, and many Syrians do not 
have valid IDs in the first place. The Syrian passport ranks 105 out of 107 in terms of 
travel freedom according to the Henley Passport Index. In recent years, constraints 
on leaving Lebanon and Turkey have increased: Since the de facto closing of the 
Turkish–Syrian border in January 2016, Syrians in Lebanon are required to apply 
for a visa to enter Turkey. Over the past few years human rights organisations have 
pointed out that Turkish border guards continue to carry out pushbacks, injuring 
and even killing Syrians as they try to cross (Human Rights Watch 2018). Similarly, 
the Greek–Turkish border has been increasingly sealed off since the EU–Turkey 
deal; in early 2016 permits for travelling within Turkey were introduced mean-
while, hindering Syrians reaching cities in the west of the country. Furthermore, 
resettlement to a third country cannot be actively pursued and is only an  option 
for a minority given UNHcR’s vulnerability criteria and the overall low  number 
of resettlements. In Turkey, it is for example the Turkish directorate General of 
Migration Management which identifies cases for resettlement consideration 
among registered TP beneficiaries and makes referrals to UNHCR. 
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… and Omnipresent Return Pressures 
With the Bashar al-Assad regime re-establishing control over areas in central Syria 
and the south around daraa and Ghouta, it has been trying to foster the image that 
the country is now entering a post-war phase. In a rare appeal in 2018, President 
al-Assad declared the country safe for Syrians to return to. However while violence 
has waned in many parts of the country, the impact of hostilities on civilians remains 
the principal driver of humanitarian needs. Torture and disappearances continue, 
and an estimated 11.7 million people were in need of various forms of humanitarian 
assistance in Syria in 2019 (UNHCR 2019). In 2019/2020, the government offen-
sive against the last rebel enclave Idlib led to 520,000 new displacements. 
In both Lebanon and Turkey, political leaders have started to put pressure on Syr-
ian refugees to return, and policies have been put in place to facilitate it through formal 
and informal actors (Fakhoury and Ozkul 2019; Şahin Mencütek 2019). Hezbollah, 
al-Assad’s ally in Lebanon, opened several offices across the country for refugees to 
register for return. The Turkish government increasingly encourages return to oppo-
sition-controlled areas by collaborating with local pro-Turkey actors. But, returning 
has direct legal consequences for Syrians in both of these host countries: In Lebanon, 
the directorate of the General Security, depending on the Ministry of Interior, stamps 
each passport at the border to ban its owner from returning for an undefined period of 
time. In Turkey, voluntary departure is considered grounds for the cessation of TP and 
refuge cannot be again sought afterwards (Refugee Rights Turkey 2017).
Legal and Economic Vulnerabilities across Educational  Attainment
descriptive statistics from the SYRMAGINE survey reveal respondents’ diverse edu-
cational backgrounds and high levels of economic and legal vulnerability, especially 
in Lebanon where living conditions for Syrians are particularly precarious. Overall, 
38 per cent of respondents had no education or had attended primary school only. 
Some 34 per cent attended lower secondary school (Grades 7–9), 12 per cent higher 
secondary school (Grades 10–12), and 16 per cent university or equivalent, reflect-
ing how all layers of Syrian society have been affected by displacement. While the 
percentage of respondents with no or only primary education was roughly similar 
across the two countries, the share who had attended upper secondary school or 
university was higher in Turkey (see Figure 1 below).
Household incomes were altogether low and insufficient, despite the vast  majority 
of (male) respondents working – mostly in the informal sector. Around half of re-
spondents lived in a household with an income of maximum USd 400 per month. 
Household income levels were significantly lower in Lebanon, with 16.5 per cent 
of respondents living off maximum USD 200 monthly (see Figure 2 below). Many 
reported to have borrowed money in the past 12 months (see Figure 3 below). 
Employment rates were roughly similar, with 90 per cent of male respondents 
and 18 per cent of female respondents working. Half of the survey respondents had 
a legal status in the two host countries, but the figures differed significantly: of those 
residing in Lebanon 28 per cent had a legal status, versus 82 per cent in Turkey. 
This reflects that in Turkey, TP automatically grants a legal stay – which is not the 
case in Lebanon (see Figure 4 below). Overall life satisfaction hence varied signifi-
cantly: on a scale of 1 to 10, it was 4.1 in Lebanon and 5.4 in Turkey on average.  
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High Return Aspirations and Low Return Movements 
In order to explore whether Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey aspire to return 
home, respondents were asked what their preference would be under the hypotheti-
cal scenario that the war in Syria were to end. On average, findings indicate a strong 
longing to return to Syria in this case (40 per cent), with significantly higher such 
aspirations in Lebanon (48 per cent) than in Turkey (31 per cent) (see Figure 5 
below). This can be largely explained by the particularly hostile official stance to-
wards refugees and the dire economic situation in Lebanon. However while many 
respondents aspired to return to Syria in the future, doing so under current con-
ditions was described as unsafe – given fears of military conscription or political 
persecution upon return, especially among those opposed to the current regime. 
Many reported that they did not know what would happen to them if they returned, 
and some believed that the regime might generally categorise refugees as political 
opponents. Others were afraid of being unable to return to Lebanon or Turkey if 
they had to flee Syria once more. Some mentioned that a lack of financial resources 
alongside difficulties in reclaiming property in Syria because of no documentation 
for it were further major obstacles.
Figure 1 
Educational Attain-
ment by Country (in 
per cent).
Figure 2 
Household Income by 
Country (in per cent).
Figure 3
Saving and Debts in 
Past 12 Months by 
Country (in per cent)
Figure 4




tions Should the War 
End (in per cent)
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While 40 per cent indicated simply aspiring to return should the war end, a 
further 25 per cent made it conditional on the outcome thereof. Many cited the 
existence of safety and security, a halt to general violence, a change of regime or in 
the security apparatus, access to former property, the availability of basic services, 
and the economic situation in Syria in this regard. conditional return was more 
prevalent among respondents in Turkey (33 per cent) than in Lebanon (17 per cent), 
which can be related to both better overall living conditions and likely a higher 
number of regime-critical refugees in the former. 
As a woman in Tripoli explained:
“As long as Bashar al-Assad is present, we won’t return, there is no safety. If 
they said ‘Bashar will be removed from power,’ we would all return. But if there 
is no security, how should we return? They say ‘we will repair your houses, we 
will rebuild,’ but it’s all a lie. There is no safety.” 
The survey also found complementary aspirations to stay assuming the war had 
ended, which were higher in Turkey (23 per cent) than in Lebanon (10 per cent). It 
therefore came as no surprise that 11 per cent in Turkey and 24 per cent in Lebanon 
wanted to migrate onwards to another country even if the war should end. Overall, 
29 per cent of respondents had attempted to leave one of the two host countries 
since 2011: some 25 per cent in Turkey versus 32 per cent in Lebanon. In Turkey, 
strong resistance to the idea of migrating to Europe was also simultaneously preva-
lent: of respondents, 58 per cent cited not wanting that even if given the necessary 
papers (Müller-Funk 2019).
Reasons for Staying
To learn more about the reasons for wanting to stay in either Lebanon or Turkey, we 
conducted narrative interviews. commonalities emerged: Over time, refugees had 
 given up hope that a safe return would be possible in the foreseeable future but 
still  wanted to remain geographically close to Syria, so as to be able to eventually 
return or at least visit the country sporadically in the future. Some had forfeited 
property in Syria and had no close family members left there meanwhile, but had a 
preference to live in a society which felt culturally close to their own one. They had 
often adapted life aspirations in a way that was acceptable for them, for instance 
by managing to continue working in the same profession as they had done prior to 
displacement. Interviewees often described how they had lived through their loss, 
grown used to a new life, and decided to focus on the present (Müller-Funk 2019).
One interviewee, for example, explained how she adapted her original life plan 
of becoming a teacher to that instead of being a mother devoted to her children’s 
education for the time being:
“I started to know Turkish, last year I learned Turkish. I started to give  lessons, 
and I started to feel alive again. I felt that there is an importance to my  existence, 
the grades of my son improved. Before, I had an objective and a dream. To teach 
a particular section of students, to change their lives. At the moment this dream 
is far away, the language barrier is still there. Maybe in the future there is a way.”
Even if working conditions were often experienced as harsh and exploitative, in-
terviewees could thus imagine building a life in the host country, and saw profes-
sional and personal opportunities given – or despite – the legal context and acute 
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discrimination. Some also perceived the host country as relatively safe compared to 
what they had lived through and known in Syria.
One young man who had deserted the army in Syria described how he felt in 
Turkey as follows:
“It is better here than in Syria, from my point of view, because as a soldier […] 
I came and I had much more freedom. No one owns me here. Nobody can tell 
me: ‘Go here, go there,’ no. I became free.”
Reasons for Moving On, and Feeling “Stuck”
SYRMAGINE results also reveal that it is a combination of political, economic,  societal, 
and individual factors at the macro, meso, and micro levels that motivate refugees 
to consider migration to another third country (onwards migration). On the macro 
level, considerations to move on were motivated by insufficient legal safety, finan-
cial vulnerability, and inadequate access to health and education services.
On the meso level, decisions about onwards migration were mostly taken within 
the family: Parents pointed out that they would leave for their children’s sake and 
often decided that the father should do so first, while his wife stayed behind with 
the children and would join later when it was considered safer to do so. At the same 
time, the decision to pursue onwards migration left more room for individual-level 
choices, especially for single adults: interviewees had sometimes gone against the 
will of their parents, who considered smuggling too risky or who were against the 
idea of their children moving even further away. 
On the micro level, the results highlight the importance of life satisfaction,  future 
imaginations, and the hope (or lack thereof) for an impending return to Syria. 
Those who aspired to move on were often profoundly dissatisfied with their cur-
rent existence and were convinced that migration would help to achieve broader 
life goals elsewhere. Interviewees often felt deprived of the life that could have been 
if the conflict had never happened. Those who aspired to move on even if the war 
ended, for example, typically had a slightly higher educational background and 
lower life satisfaction. Respondents who embraced the idea of moving on often had 
“a project” to realise eventually in a different location. They had strong imagina-
tions about building up a better – and stable – life elsewhere, especially in Western 
(European) countries. Educational aspirations were dominant among those who 
wished to migrate onwards, reflecting the fact that a good education is out of reach 
for many Syrian children and youth (especially in Lebanon). 
A young woman in Tripoli stated for example:
“I know that I cannot live the coming seven or eight years in the same difficult 
conditions, in one place. I don’t want to arrive at a point where I cannot learn 
anything, I know where I am going, and what the difficulty is, and that there is 
no return to Lebanon. But it’s necessary to take risks in life, at least to be able 
to finish my studies.”
On the whole, imaginations about destination countries seemed to be more instru-
mental – meaning about fulfilling one’s life project – than orientated towards a 
particular destination. Interviewed Syrians aspired to live in a place where they 
had existing ties, a community support network, language skills, and could imagine 
creating a life for themselves. They gathered information about risks involved when 
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travelling to Europe through their own personal networks, and contrariwise did not 
consider that from awareness campaigns about the perils of migrating irregularly. 
One key finding was that the majority of interviewees could not realise their 
aspirations regarding either return or onwards migration. While many retained 
a profound belief in the former, there was a strong mismatch between hypotheti-
cally aspiring to it and actually being able to realise return. Some reported that 
reflections on returning right now were not influenced by a wish to do so per se 
but rather by family obligations back in Syria, financial and legal vulnerability, and 
insufficient access to healthcare in the host country, which motivated some to con-
sider return even under conditions of high uncertainty and risk (Müller-Funk and 
Fransen 2020). On the other hand, those who envisaged and planned to move on to 
Europe were often those who had the financial means to cross borders irregularly, 
who had extended social networks abroad, and who were willing to take significant 
risks. Many interviewees (especially in Lebanon) reported feeling stuck: neither be-
ing able to return nor to move on as they wished to. 
As a male respondent in Beirut rued:
“I was the last person to leave Syria, I did not think that I would ever leave. I 
don’t like this country; you cannot live here. I am one of those people who likes 
people, I like to have friends, I like to go out, I like to move. Here, everything 
is forbidden. It’s like a prison here. I just move from here to my work and from 
my work back to here. I cannot move.”
Reflecting on the Consequences: Including Refugees’  
Perspectives 
Recent international efforts to find solutions to forced displacement have empha-
sised that an approach is needed that favours refugees’ inclusion and participation 
(Global compact on Refugees 2018). While the willingness to include refugees’ per-
spectives in EU policy has been repeatedly articulated (Action Plan of the Partner-
ship on Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees 2017), some have questioned whether 
this is merely a box-ticking exercise rather than genuine inclusion however.
One of SYRMAGINE’s core objectives was to provide better data about refugees’ 
own standpoints, as a basis for designing evidence-based policies. Refugees partici-
pated in data collection and analysis for the project too. Except for the principal 
investigator, all of the other four authors contributing to this text have experienced 
displacement from Syria to Lebanon or Turkey themselves, and have worked for 
different non-governmental organisations providing services to refugees. Based on 
this bottom-up approach, a number of policy recommendations can be formulated.
We found that returning to Syria under current conditions is in many cases 
 coerced, and can potentially lead to re-displacement – internally or externally. With 
the conflict still ongoing and different foreign and local armed groups continuing to 
dominate the divided parts of the Syrian landscape, no end to violence and politi-
cal persecution is on the horizon – at least in the near future. First, some will never 
be able to return safely to Syria as long as the current regime remains in power. 
 Second, from a legal perspective, Lebanon and Turkey cannot be considered safe 
countries as long as refoulement persists and the Geneva convention is not applied 
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to Syrian refugees – even if many prefer to stay in the Middle East region and await 
a potential return. It is our recommendation that, for the time being, policy meas-
ures should thus focus on the following: 
1. expanding safe and legal ways to reach third countries;
2. supporting refugees’ empowerment and strengthening anti-discrimination in 
Lebanon and Turkey; and,
3. halting return campaigns or refoulement in any form, as return should be vol-
untary, safe, dignified, and sustainable. 
(1.) Measures to expand safe and legal ways to third countries  
 • Increase resettlement: Both the number of countries participating in UNHcR’s 
resettlement programmes and annual quotas for resettled refugees should be 
increased significantly among those which have ratified the Geneva Conven-
tion. This would reduce the vulnerability of the countries most affected by the 
refugee crisis. 
 • Introduce humanitarian visas: Provide the possibility to apply for asylum at the 
consulates of countries who uphold the International Refugee  Protection  regime. 
This would reduce the number of refugees entering third countries irregularly 
and would allow less well-off and more risk-averse individuals to  access safety 
elsewhere. Instead of spending their savings on smugglers,  refugees could use 
them to rebuild their lives in a new country. 
 • Expand sponsorship programmes: Introduce large-scale private and associa-
tion-based sponsorship programmes for refugees. This would entail a group of 
individuals or an association from a safe host country sponsoring a refugee to 
support his or her resettlement. Such sponsorships would allow individuals and 
civil society actors in host countries to actively support refugees in building up 
an independent life in the host country.  
 • Revise the dublin convention: This legal instrument puts disproportionate asy-
lum responsibility on southern European member states. Many interviewees 
could not imagine to make a life in Greece given the shocking conditions on the 
country’s islands.
 • Stop awareness campaigns on the risks of irregular migration: Most refugees do 
not consult this type of material when taking migration decisions. This would 
make funds available for alternative, more useful measures.
(2.) Measures to support empowerment and social cohesion in Lebanon and Turkey
 • Share the financial burden: Increase international funds to provide tangible 
and rapid support to countries under the greatest pressure, especially those 
with high numbers of refugees, significant unemployment rates, and insuffi-
cient access to healthcare services – which are particularly prone to shocks. 
The current cOVId-19 pandemic, for example, has resulted in a sudden loss of 
income for many refugees in Lebanon and Turkey. 
 • continue advocacy for the International Refugee Protection regime: Support 
local organisations and NGOs in their advocacy and monitoring activities in 
countries which do not fully apply the Geneva convention or have no national 
asylum law to advocate for refugees’ legal and health protection, as well as to 
protect refugees from forcible return.
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 • Provide the right to work: Provide refugees registered with UNHcR and  holders 
of TP automatically with a residence permit which grants the unrestricted right 
to earn a living. Meaningful opportunities for qualified refugees should be cre-
ated within local labour markets. However, the right to work should not be con-
fused with self-reliance. clear mechanisms should be put in place to support 
unemployed or disabled refugees. 
 • Support social cohesion: Support conflict-sensitive peace-building projects 
which aim at recognising the vulnerabilities at both the refugee and host-
community levels, especially in the fields of professional training and cultural 
initiatives. These should include empowerment projects for women – such as 
cooperatives, joint vocational trainings, courses for the illiterate – as well as 
neighbourhood workshops and joint dinners to create spaces where refugees 
and locals can exchange experiences and fears. Levantine cultural centres that 
can acquaint host communities with Syrian music, cuisine, and culture should 
also be created.
 • Promote education: Youth can be bridge-builders and reduce discrimination 
and prejudice against refugees. Train teachers in how to deal with refugee stu-
dents, especially those suffering from discrimination and post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Set up recreational activities for both local and refugee children. In-
clude displacement as a topic in school and university curricula. Create specific 
scholarships for refugees to facilitate their access to higher education.
 • Strengthen language training: Increase Turkish-language training for Syrian 
refugees there, for instance in refugee camps, factories, vocational centres, 
and schools, and introduce language courses for mothers – alongside childcare 
 facilities. Governments could provide incentives to employers for sending em-
ployees to language-training courses. 
(3.) Measures to support voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return
 • Stop automatic loss of protection because of a “go-and-see visit” to Syria: Refu-
gees who decide to return individually in order to obtain a more complete pic-
ture of conditions in Syria before deciding their next steps should not be penal-
ised. They should be able to return to protection if conditions in the country of 
origin remain unsafe. 
 • Protect property rights:  Access to former property is a key element in refugees’ 
return decisions, and so advocating for these individuals being granted related 
documentation is vital. consider voices and initiatives from within Syrian civil 
society, which have lobbied for fair property rights.  
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